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I.

Introduction:
In November 2008, Ernesto Galarza, a U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican heritage, was arrested

by the Allentown Police Department in a series of drug arrests aimed at the construction
contractor for whom he worked.1 Galarza was ultimately acquitted by a jury of any drug-related
conspiracy charges, but was initially taken into custody and detained along with the other
arrestees.2 At the time of his arrest, he had his Social Security Card and a Pennsylvania driver’s
license in his wallet, and told local officials that he was born in Perth Amboy, NJ. 3 Nonetheless,
an Allentown police investigator called Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—pursuant
to Allentown’s policy of contacting ICE whenever someone is “suspected” of being an “alien
subject to deportation”—and reported that Galarza might be an undocumented immigrant.4
Based on this tip, ICE issued an immigration detainer, asking prison officials to hold Galarza
while ICE investigated his immigration status. 5

1

Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 637-38
3 Id. at 637
4 Id.
5 Id. Immigration detainers are used as an enforcement mechanism in what was formerly known as the Secure
Communities Program (SCP). Secure Communities, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). The SCP functioned as an information -sharing
program between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ICE. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions,
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm) (last visited
Aug. 11, 2015). Traditionally, when someone is arrested in a state or local jail, the jail takes the arrestee’s
fingerprints, and the fingerprints are then sent to an FBI database. Id. Under the SCP, the fingerprints are then
forwarded to ICE. Id. ICE uses the fingerprints to investigate the individual’s immigration status. Id. If – upon
completion of its investigation – ICE suspects that the individual is violating civil immigration law, it can issue a
detainer to the state or local jail; requesting that the individual be detained until ICE agents arrive to assume custody
of the arrestee. Id. The individual can remain in detention at the state or local jail even after he/she is scheduled for
release by the jail. Id. ICE – once it has custody of the individual – can initiate deportation proceedings. Id. In
November 2014, the Obama Administration altered the SCP; the changes were announced in a memorandum issued
by ICE Secretary, Jeh Charles Johnson. Jeh Charles Johnson, Secure Communities, U.S. DEP ’T OF HOMELAND
SECURIT Y, at 2-3, (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communitie s.pdf.
The memorandum announced that the SCP would be renamed the Priorities Enforcement Program (PEP), and that
the program’s focus would shift from a broad-based detention of all suspected immigration violators – including
non-violent offenders – to a more limited detention, focusing only on those individuals with serious criminal
records. Id. The memorandum cited several factors that made such changes necessary, including a deficient of trust
between immigrant communities and Law Enforcement, pushback from st ate and local governments refusing to
honor detainer requests or limiting compliance therewith, increasing litigation revolving around ICE detainers, and
2
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Despite posting his $15,000 bail the day after his arrest, Galarza was not released from
Lehigh County Prison because of the ICE detainer. 6 Instead, he remained in jail for the next three
days, without a warrant or an explanation for his continued detention.7 He was eventually
released after ICE agents arrived to interrogate him and confirmed his U.S. citizenship.8 Galarza
filed a lawsuit against the Allentown Police Department of Lehigh County and ICE seeking
damages for losing his part-time job and lost wages.9 In April 2012, the District Court granted inpart and denied in-part the defendants’ motion to dismiss.10 In May 2014, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled in Galarza’s favor, holding that compliance with ICE detainers is not
mandatory and that Lehigh County was free to release Galarza after he posted bail. The case was
eventually settled and Galarza was awarded a total of $105,000 in damages and attorney’s fees. 11
Soon thereafter, “the Lehigh County Board of Commissions voted unanimously to end the
County’s policy of imprisoning people on ICE detainers.”12
The Obama Administration has deported a record number of individuals.13 Because of the
SCP, the Obama Administration has deported over 2.3 million people. Before the Obama

decisions by federal courts rejecting the authority of state and local governments to issue detainers. Id.
Accordingly, the secretary directed ICE to only issue detainers for those aliens who have been convicted of a serious
offense or who otherwise pose a danger to national security. Id.
6 Galarza, 745 F.3d at 637.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 638.
10 Id. “[T]he District Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims against Lehigh
County on the ground that neither of the policies identified in the plaintiff’s Amended Complain is unconstitutional
because both are consistent with federal statutes and regulation.” (internal quotation marks omitted and formatting
altered).
11 ACLU, Galarza v. Szalczyk , (June 18, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants -rights/galarza-v-szalczyk
12 Id.
13 Julia Preston, Republicans Resist Obama’s Move to Dismantle Apparatus of Deportation , N.Y. T IMES, (Jan 15,
2015) (noting that the secure communities program has lead to the deportation of 2.3 million people under the
Obama Administration) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 01/ 16/us/secure-communities-immigration-programbattle.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=photo -spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=topnews; see CLINIC, State and Localities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests, CAT HOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGRAT ION NETWORK (Nov. 2014). https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles -clinic/states-and-localities-limitcompliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (Estimating that the Obama Administration deported nearly 1.5 million
during the first term).
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Administration overhauled the SCP, many states and municipalities – as a result of increased
litigation – began to alter the scope of compliance with ICE detainers. Many municipalities
began refusing to honor ICE detainers all together. And, some states began passing legislation
limiting the scope of state compliance with ICE detainers. Recently, the Obama Administration
overhauled the SCP; renaming it the “Priorities Enforcement Program” (PEP) 14 and shifting the
program’s focus to target individuals with serious criminal records.
In light of certain legal and public policy considerations, state and local governments
should either refuse to honor ICE detainer requests altogether or follow in the footsteps of
Connecticut and California and pass laws similar to the Transparency and Responsibility Using
State Tools (“Trust”) Act, which limits the scope of compliance with ICE detainers. Although
the Obama Administration reformed the SCP, the new program continues to rely on ICE
detainers as the primary enforcement mechanism, and will, therefore, continue to raise serious
legal issues for state and local governments. 15 Additionally, there is no guarantee that the new
changes will remain.16
The Trust Act limits state and local law enforcement’s ability to prolong detention based
on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer requests. 17 The legal and public policy
reasons weigh heavily in favor of states adopting similar policies, and might even go as far as to
warrant that local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) across the country voluntarily refuse to

14

See supra, footnote 5.
Aura Bogado, Goodbye, Secure Communities. Hello, Priority Enforcement Program, COLORLINES, Nov. 21, 2014,
http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/11/goodbye_secure_communities_hello_priority_enforcement_program.html
16 See infra, section II(A)(3)(iii).
17 Recent Legislation, Immigration Law - Criminal Justice and Immigration Enforcement - California Limits Local
Entities' Compliance with Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detainer Requests. - Trust Act, 2013 Cal. Stat.
4650 (Codified at Cal. Gov’t Code §§7282-7282.5 (West Supp. 2014))., 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2593, 2593 (2014).
15
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honor ICE detainer requests, as many have already done. Several public policy reasons militate
against willful and unrestrained enforcement of detainer requests. First, recent cases have made it
clear that detainer requests are not warrants, and so prolonged detention of a legal person, in
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, can result in significant liability for local LEAs.
Second, statutes and case law make it clear that local LEAs are not required to comply with
detainer requests. Third, the cost of enforcing detainer requests can burden local LEAs,
especially because the federal government does not compensate them for prolonging the
detention of prisoners in local jails on suspected violations of federal immigration law. Fourth,
recent studies show that the Secure Communities Program, in which immigration detainers play
a significant role, does not lower crime rates, and in fact, may even negatively impact law
enforcement.
Part II will examine the historical development of detainer requests and its current state in
the context of the Secure Communities Program, a general trend that developed among LEAs
refusing to honor detainer requests, and the passage of the TRUST Act. Part III will consider the
legal and public policy issues implicated by detainer requests as well as the legal issues
implicated by State laws seeking to regulate detainer requests. Part IV will conclude that in light
of the legal problems that arise from detainers, the liability that municipalities may incur, the
cost of enforcing detainers, the failure of detainers to lower crime rates, and the lack of legal
obstacles in the way of legislation that significantly curtails the scope of detainer requests every
state should either adopt a version of California’s Trust Act or local municipalities should
consider not honoring detainer requests all together.
II.

Background/Overvie w

5

This section will discuss the historical development of detainer requests as a deportation
mechanism and its modern development within the context of the Secure Communities Program.
I will also discuss a general trend that developed among local LEA refusing to honor detainer
requests, the eventual passage of the TRUST Act, and recent actions taken by the Obama
Administration in overhauling the Secure Communities Program.
A. Historical Development of ICE Detainer Requests
1. What is an Immigration Detainer and how does it work?
Immigration detainers are used by “ICE and other Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) officials to identify potentially deportable individuals who are housed in local jails or
prisons. . . .”18 Detainers are requests, not commands; they are not warrants and do not provide
probable cause. Additionally, they are not indicative of a person’s immigration status, nor are
they capable of initiating deportation proceedings.19 Unlike a Notice to Appear (NTA), which is
an official civil- immigration filing that commences a removal proceeding against an individual,
an immigration detainer merely states that “an investigation has been initiated to determine
whether this person is subject to removal from the United States”20 Any authorized immigration
official or local police officer designated to act as an immigration official can issue a detainer to
any other federal, state, or local LEA. 21 Functionally, “[a] detainer notifies the LEA that ICE
intends to assume custody of an arrestee, requests information about the arrestee’s pending
release, and requests that the LEA ‘maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be

18

Immigration Policy Center, Immigration Detainers A Comprehensive Look , (Feb 17, 2010),
http://immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/immigration-detainers-co mprehensive-look
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. see 8 C.F.R §§ 287.7(a),(b); see also 8 C.F.R § 287(g).
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released for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) to
provide ICE time to assume custody.”22
2. History and Development of Immigration Detainers
Historically, “[d]etainers have long been used by federal immigration officials.” 23 Before
1987, immigration detainers only served to notify jail or prison officials that federal immigration
officials were interested in a particular prisoner, and to request that federal immigration officials
be notified before the release of the prisoner in question.24 In 1987, however, the Executive
Branch enacted federal legislation requiring agencies receiving an immigration detainer to
maintain custody of the prisoner of interest for up to 48 hours after his or her release date, to
allow time for immigration officials to arrive and take custody. 25 The importance of detainers
increased dramatically after the federal government launched the “Secure Communities”
program.26 The program was implemented with the goal of deporting immigrants who committed
serious crimes. Particularly, the program was interested in “prisoners who were awaiting trial or
serving sentences for local, state, or federal crimes.”27
Before the Secure Communities program, the process of identifying and interviewing
those suspected of immigration violations was labor intensive, timely, costly, and inefficient.28
The Secure Communities program, however, fused traditional arrest procedures with

22 Recent Legislation, supra note 15, at 2594 (citing ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Immigr. &

Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm) (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
23 Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 Wake
Forest J.L. & Pol'y 281, 286 (2013).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Thomas J. Miles and Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence From “Secure
Communities”, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming) “Federal personnel conducted these screenings in less than 15 percent of
local jails and prisons, and local officials were authorized to do the screen ings themselves in only about two percent
of the nation’s counties.”
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technological innovation to create “a system of universal and automated screening such that
every single person arrested by a local enforcement official anywhere in the country would be
screened by the federal government for immigration status and deportability eligibility.”29
Normally, when someone is arrested and booked by a LEA, “his fingerprints are taken and
forwarded electronically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which conducts a criminal
background check and sends the results to the LEA.”30 Under the Secure Communities program,
the fingerprints received by the FBI are automatically and electronically forwarded to the DHS. 31
“DHS then compares the fingerprints against its Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT), a database which stores biometric and biographical information on persons
encountered by the agency in the course of its immigration-related or other activities.”32
The database contains fingerprints of three different categories of foreign-born
individuals: (1) Non-Citizens currently in the U.S. in contravention of immigration law, such as
person who were previously deported or overstayed their visas; (2) noncitizens who are lawfully
in the U.S. but are arrested and might become deportable if they are convicted of the crime for
which they have been arrested; (3) citizens who naturalized at some point after their finge rprints
were included in the database.33 If the fingerprints received by the DHS match a set in its
database, DHS personnel evaluate the person’s immigration status and determine whether to
place a “detainer” on him/her.34 The detainer requests that the local LEA hold the person for 48
hours beyond the scheduled release to facilitate the person’s transfer by ICE into federal custody,

29

Id. (emphasis in original).
ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement,
https://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm) (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Miles & Cox, supra note 23, at 18.
30
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and to initiate deportation proceedings thereafter. 35 Thus, the detainer allows the federal
government to readily apprehend and place in deportation proceedings a noncitizen who would
otherwise be released by the local LEA. 36
Fully implementing the program took nearly four years. 37 “Beginning on October 27,
2008 the federal government rolled out the program on a county-by-county basis.”38 In the spring
of 2012, the Secure Communities program was functioning in all but a handful of counties.

39

By

January 2013, it was completely implemented nationwide, in 3,181 jurisdictions.40 The program
has led to more than 300,000 deportations since 2008. 41
3. State and Local Governments Respond to Detainer Requests
Currently, a movement is underway whereby state governments, local governments, and
federal courts are challenging the enforcement of ICE detainers. At first, it was unclear whether
compliance with Secure Communities was mandatory. 42 The DHS has since made it clear that
compliance with detainers is not mandatory because they are merely “requests” and not
“commands.”43 Initially, the only way a local LEA could prevent DHS’s immigration checks

35

8 CFR 287.7
See id.
37 Miles & Cox, supra note 23, at 19.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Elise Foley & Roque Planas, Trust Act Signed In California To Limit Deportation Program, HUFFINGT ON POST ,
(Oct. 5, 2013, 4:414). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/05/trust-act-signed_n_4050168.html
41 AP Report: California Immigrant Deportations Plummet After TRUST Act, CBS SF BAY AREA, (April 6, 2014),
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/04/06/immigrat ion-deportation-trust-act/
42 Miles and Cox, supra note 26, at n.14; see 8 C.F.R. § 287(d) (“Upon a determination by the Department to issue a
detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sund ays, and holidays in order to permit assumption
of custody by the Department.” (emphasis added)).
43 ACLU, Sample Letter Issued to Local Counties Urging Reform in ICE Detainer Compliance , (July 15, 2014)
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/2514/0552/4157/ 2014_07_16_ICE.pdf. “In a brief filed in a 2013 case challenging ICE
detainers, government attorneys representing the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that ‘ICE
detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 are voluntary requests.’. . . ICE detainers . . . do not impose a
requirement upon state or local law enforcement agencies.” “On February 25, 2014, David Ragsdale, then -Acting
Director of ICE . . . confirmed that ICE detainers ‘are not mandatory as a matter of law.’”
36
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from taking place would be to stop fingerprinting arrestees altogether. 44 However, when it
became clear that ICE detainers were not mandatory, many jurisdictions simply refused to honor
them.45
i.

Local Counties Refusing to Honor ICE Detainers

In 2013, the city of Newark, New Jersey issued a policy refusing to honor ICE detainers
that was among the most expansive in the nation “because it has no exception for particularly
serious offenses.”46 Other state and local governments continued this trend in 2014, “following a
decision by a federal court in Oregon concluding that some detainers violate arrestees’ Fourth
Amendment Rights.”47 To date, three states, the District of Columbia, at least twenty five cities,
and over two-hundred counties have officially restricted the extent which law enforcement may
continue to detain individuals to hand over to ICE. 48
Recently, in Colorado—a state where ICE issued more than 8,700 detainers in two
years—all of the state’s 64 Sherriffs announced that they will no longer honor ICE detainers. 49
And in September 2014, the Long Island Sherriff’s Department announced that it would no
longer honor ICE detainers “unless federal officials produce warrants from a judge”—citing
concerns over civil rights lawsuits.50 Lastly, on October 22, 2014, the New York City Council
passed legislation that limits City compliance with detainer requests only where those detainers

44 Miles & Cox, supra note 26, at 20.
45

Id. at 34.
Rutgers School of Law, A Brick City Victory: Newark Police Refuse to Honor ICE Detainers, CLINIC NEWS, at 67, (Fall Edition, 2014 - No.1) https://law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/ClinicNewsFall2014.pdf
47 Id.; see Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 503040 (D. ORE. APR. 11, 2014).
48 CLINIC, supra note 13; Julia Preston, Republicans Resist Obama’s Move to Dismantle Apparatus of Deportation ,
N.Y. T IMES, (Jan 15, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 01/16/us/secure-communities-immigration-programbattle.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=photo -spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=topnews
49 Keith Coffman, All county sheriffs in Colorado halt federal immigration holds: ACLU, REUT ERS, (Sept. 18, 2014,
6:43pm) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/18/us -usa-colorado-immigrat ion-idUSKBN0HD2PI20140918
50 Kristin Thorne, LONG ISLAND SHERIFFS WON'T CONTINUE IMMIGRANT DETENTIONS, EYE WITNESS NEWS ABC 7, (Sept.
18, 2014) http://7online.com/politics/long-island-sheriffs-saying-no-to-immigrant-detentions/314121/.
46
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are accompanied by a warrant from a judge and “the subject of the warrant was convicted within
the last five years of a violent or serious crime, or is a possible match on the terrorism watch
list.”51 In total, nearly 270 jurisdictions are refusing to issue ICE detainers.52
ii.

The TRUST ACT: States’ Attempt to Limit the Scope of Compliance
with ICE Detainers

In 2013, Connecticut – soon followed by California – passed legislation that significantly
curtailed the scope of detainer requests. On October 5, 2013 California Governor Jerry Brown
signed the Trust Act into law.53 “The Trust Act limits local discretion to enforce detainers.”54
Essentially, local LEAs can only enforce a detainer if the prisoner in question has ever been
convicted of one of a defined range of crimes. 55 To be sure, the range of crimes is extensive in
the California bill, “encompassing obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or use of a
weapon, or any state felony, among other crimes.”56 The Connecticut law, in contrast, only
honors ICE detainers if the person has been convicted of a serious or violent felony.57 Governor
Brown signed the Trust Act after he vetoed an earlier version of the bill, calling it “fatally
flawed” because it barred the state from detaining individuals on behalf of ICE “even when the
individual is charged with or convicted of significant crimes, including offenses such as child

51

Jillian Jorgensen, Council Passes Bill to Stop Cooperation With Federal Immigration Detainers, NEW YORK
OBSERVER, (Oct. 22, 2014, 3:45pm) http://observer.com/2014/10/council-passes-bills-to-stop-cooperation-withfederal-immigration-detainers/
52 Julia Preston, Republicans Resist Obama’s Move to Dismantle Apparatus of Deportation , N.Y. T IMES, (Jan 15,
2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 01/16/us/secure-communities-immigration-programbattle.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=photo -spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=topnews
53 Recent Legislation, supra note 15, at 2593
54 Id. at page 3.
55 Id.
56 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
57 Amanda Peterson Beadle, States Work To Improve Immigration Policies As Senate Immigration Bill Debate
Begins, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL : IMMIGRATION IMPACT , (June 7, 2013)
http://immigrationimpact.com/ 2013/06/07/states -work-to-imp rove-immig ration-policies-as-senate-immigrat ion-billdebate-begins/#sthash.1SLgy5Ps.dpuf
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abuse, drug trafficking and gang activity.”58 The current version of the Trust Act alters its
predecessor by “making the list of crimes classified as serious offenses more extensive.”59 The
number of deportations has declined dramatically since the passage of the Trust Act. 60
Preliminary data on California suggests at least a 44% drop in deportations, from 2,984 to 1,660
since the passage of the Trust Act.61
iii.

President Obama’s Executive Action Reforming the Use of
Immigration Detainers

In light of the number of state and local governments taking action to limit the scope of
ICE detainers under the Secure Communities Program, President Obama recently issued an
Executive Action significantly overhauling the program.62 The new measure, known as the
“Priority Enforcement Program” (PEP), “will continue to rely on finger-print based biometric
data submitted during bookings by state and local law enforcement agencies to the [FBI] for
criminal background checks.”63 Now, however, ICE will only seek the transfer of custody if the
arrestee has been convicted of a serious crime or is a perceived threat to national security. 64 This
brings federal law more in line with the rules and policies espoused by the Trust Act.
It is not clear how permanent these new reforms will be. President Obama’s actions are
being challenged in Congress and in the Courts. Since President Obama announced his
Executive Action, twenty-four states – led by Texas– have signed onto a lawsuit challenging
these actions.65 Additionally, President Obama is facing pushback from a Republican-controlled

58

Foley & Planas, supra note 37
Id.
60 Coffman, supra note 46
61 Id.
62 Preston, supra note 49
63 Jeh Charles Johnson, Secure Communities, U.S. DEP ’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, at 2-3, (Nov. 20, 2014)
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf
64 Id. at 2.
65 Ashley Killough, 24 states now suing Obama over immigration, CNN, (Dec. 10, 2014)
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/10/politics/immigration-lawsuit/
59
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Congress.66 Recently, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would restore the Secure
Communities Program.67 For now, President Obama has vowed to veto the measure.68 But, with
the 2016 presidential elections on the horizon – if Republicans gain control of the presidency – it
is possible that the Secure Communities Program will be restored. Therefore, in light of
challenges by Congress, the Courts, and a potential shift in the White House, state and local
governments should continue passing affirmative policies that regulate interactions between
federal immigration officials and prisoners housed in state and local jails.

III.

Legal and Public Policy Issues Implicated by Detainer Requests Require that State
and Local Governments Reform How They Use Them
The use of immigration detainers raises several legal challenges, especially where LEAs

detain persons with legal immigration status. The Fourth Amendment is implicated because
detainers are not warrants; therefore, continued detention based on their issuance raises Fourth
Amendment concerns.69 Immigration detainers also raise potential Equal Protection problems
because initial determinations about detaining someone “suspected” of violating immigration
laws is often made based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. 70 Moreover, the Tenth
Amendment is also implicated because, should the federal government move to compel LEAs to
detain certain individuals, it would impermissibly coerce and conscript state and local
government functions.71

66

Preston, supra note 49
Id. (“[T]he House passed a Homeland Security funding bill that would cancel his programs protecting illegal
immigrants. The measure would restore Secure Communities and increase its funding, while taking away the
president’s authority to set priorities for deportation. Mr. Obama said [] that he would veto the measure, which now
goes to the Senate.”).
68 Id.
69 U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
70 U.S. CONST . amend. XIV.
71 U.S. CONST . amend. X.
67
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Several public policy issues raise additional concerns for immigration detainers. First,
detainer requests burden municipalities with extended jail time expenses and with the legal fees
needed to defend their actions under an immigration detainer. Second, with respect to law
enforcement, detainers have had little to no effect on crime reduction.72 In fact, detainers may
exacerbate crime rates by obstructing community policing. 73
A. Legal Problems and Municipal Liability
As discussed, immigration detainers can result in litigation on issues related to the Fourth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendme nt, respectively.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring
the issuance of a warrant with probable cause before a place is searched or a person or thing is
seized.74 Hence, under the Fourth Amendment, arrests must be either based on a warrant or
supported by probable cause to believe that the person has committed the violation in question. 75
Furthermore, “[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures
that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”76 For this reason, detainers raise
serious Fourth Amendment concerns because there is “no requirement of probable cause prior to
prolonged detention pursuant to a detainer.”77 As a result, “[t]he absence of a probable cause

72

See generally Miles & Cox, supra note 26
Recent Legislation, supra note 15, at 2599
74 U.S. CONST . amend. IV
75 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963) (“The lawfulness of the arrest without warrant, in turn, must be based
upon probable cause, which exists where the facts and circumstances within t heir (the officers’) knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); but
see Keil v. Triveline, 661 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Officers may be entitled to qualified immunity if they
arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided that the mistake is
objectively reasonable”).
76 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (internal citations omitted).
77 Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 695,
634 (2013)
73

14

requirement routinely appears to result in warrantless investigatory arrests pursuant to
immigration detainers.”78
Another problem is the lack of procedural safeguards in the issuance of detainers.
Typically, ICE lodges a detainer against a suspected immigration violator by faxing the Form I247 detainer to the prison or jail.79 Under most circumstances, a detainer is then issued based
solely on the fact that an investigation has been “initiated.”80 The initiation of an investigation,
however, does not sufficiently establish probable cause, because the Fourth Amendment does not
permit seizures for mere investigations. 81 In Arizona v. United States,82 Justice Alito highlighted
this issue with a hypothetical.83 Justice Alito imagines that a police officer, during a traffic-stop
for a non-immigration violation such as speeding, “acquires reasonable suspicion to believe that
the driver entered the country illegally.”84 Justice Alito points out that, absent reasonable
suspicion, the traffic stop could “become unlawful if . . . prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete the mission.”85 Justice Alto explains that the officer’s reasonable suspicion
“that [the driver] committed a different crime” would justify extending the detention “for a
reasonable time to verify or dispel that suspicion.”86
Accordingly, Justice Alito warns that the “length and nature” of the additional
investigation must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, because if prolonged, it can
become an arrest requiring probable cause.87 He notes that “the line between detention and arrest

78

Id. at 696
Id.
80 Id.
81 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012) (“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration
status would raise constitutional concerns”).
82 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.
83 Id. at 2528 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 2528-29
86 Id.
87 Id. at 2529
79
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is crossed when the police, without probable cause or warrant, forcibly remove a person from his
home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he
is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.”88 Analogizing this holding to the use of
ICE detainers, detaining an individual after she has been cleared for release from jail is akin to
“forcibly removing” her from a place where she is entitled to be, and would therefore be deemed
an arrest requiring probable cause or a warrant.
Additionally, there is no requirement that a person held pursuant to a detainer be taken
before a neutral and detached magistrate within 48 hours absent extraordinary circumstances.89
This practice is especially problematic because it “runs directly counter to the Court's declaration
that the Fourth Amendment requires any person subjected to a warrantless arrest be brought
before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours including weekends and holidays - absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”90
In Miranda-Olvares91 , the plaintiff was arrested for violations of state family law, but
was not released after posting bail, due to an ICE detainer.92 The defendant argued that her
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the Fourth Amendment analysis only
applies to allegations that an individual was deprived of liberty prior to the government’s
determination of legal custody.93 The court, however, disagreed with the defendant’s argument,
and asserted that the “continuation of her detention based on the ICE detainer embarked
Miranda-Olivares on a subsequent and new ‘prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment
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custody.’”94 The court endorsed the proposition that an arrestee’s liberty could not be restricted
after “a court has either ordered [her] release or concluded that that the lawful authority to hold
them on a case no longer exists . . . .”95 After such a point, “the court may no longer treat the
detainee as a pretrial detainee . . . .”96 Hence, “any continued detention beyond the period
necessary to execute the [court] order [is] analyzed as a new arrest under the Fourth
Amendment.”97 The court concluded that, “upon the resolution of her state charges, the County
no longer had probable cause to justify her detention.”98
2. Equal Protection (Fourteenth Amendment)
Detainer enforcement presents a dilemma for officials because, oftentimes, identifying
potential deportable individuals requires that government officials make characterizations based
on race, ethnicity, or national origin. The Equal Protection clause prohibits discrimination based
on race, ethnicity, or national origin, unless such characterization overcomes strict scrutiny.99 In
Morales v, Chadbourne,100 the plaintiff, Ms. Morales, alleged “that ICE officials impermissibly
based their decision to issue a detainer solely on her place of birth and/or her Spanish
surname.”101 Ms. Morales’s encounter with immigration authorities began when she was
arrested on state criminal charges for allegedly misrepresenting information on a state public
benefits application.102 At the State Police station, a state official asked Ms. Morales whether she
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was “legal.”103 Ms. Morales replied that she was born in Guatemala and naturalized in the United
States.104 Following her initial interview, a state official reported Ms. Morales’ information to
ICE.105 Searches of ICE’s database did not reveal any immigration violations by Ms. Morales. 106
Nevertheless, ICE issued a “Notice of Action” to the State authorities, informing them that Ms.
Morales’ immigration status was under investigation. 107 During a state court hearing to resolve
her criminal charge, the judge withdrew the warrant against Ms. Morales and released her on
$10,000 personal recognizance.108 But, since the immigration detainer was issued against Ms.
Morales, she remained in state custody for an additional night. 109 ICE assumed custody of Ms.
Morales the following day; she was only released when ICE confirmed her citizenship after
subjecting her to several hours of interviews.110
Ms. Morales later filed suit to remedy her prolonged detention; she alleged that ICE
“assumed without sufficient legal cause” that she was not a U.S. citizen and incorrectly listed her
nationality as Guatemalan in the detainer form. 111 She further alleged that ICE officials “made
this assumption based on her race ethnicity, and/or national origin.”112 Additionally, she argued
that ICE would not have assumed that she was an “alien” without conducting further research,
had it not been for her race, ethnicity, and/or national origin. 113
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The court agreed with Ms. Morales, asserting that “ICE investigated Ms. Morales simply
because she was born in another country.”114 The court explained that, “[u]sing Ms. Morales’
nation of birth as a sole permissible basis for her loss of liberty does not pass constitutional
muster.”115 The court found this to “particularly true in light of the large number of current
United States citizens that were born in another country” because, “[t]o hold otherwise would
mean that the approximately 17 million foreign-born United States citizens could automatically
be subject to detention and deprivation of their liberty rights.”116 The court observed that, “[s]uch
a large number of immediate suspects, based solely on their national origin, cannot be justified
under the equal protection clause.”117 Additionally, the court noted that the ICE official “had
information in his possession, or readily available to him, that would have permitted him to
verify Ms. Morales’s status as a United States citizen before issuing the detainer [,]” but
nevertheless “categorized Ms. Morales as foreign born and treated her differently than others
based on this impermissible characteristic.”118
3. Tenth Amendment
The sphere of federalism carved out by the Tenth Amendment does not permit the federal
government to coerce or conscript state and local government entities. 119 In the context of
immigration detainers, the issue arises as to whether or not state and local government
compliance with detainer requests is voluntary or mandatory. 120 To date, “[t]here has been
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considerable debate and confusion over whether immigration detainers act as a federal request or
as a command to state or local officials.”121 The language of the regulation purports to command
state and local law enforcement agencies receiving an immigration detainer to continue holding
the target of the detainer in custody. 122
It would seem, however, that modern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence would forbid the
federal government from mandating state and local government compliance with ICE detainers.
In New York v. United States,123 the Supreme Court held that a federal law that “created a
statutory duty for states to provide safe disposal of radioactive waste generated within their
borders” violated the Tenth Amendment. 124 Additionally, “the law provided that states would
‘take title’ to any waste within their borders that were not properly disposed of . . . and then
would ‘be liable for all damages directly incurred.’”125 According to the majority, “[f]orcing
states to accept ownership of radioactive wastes would impermissibly ‘commandeer’ state
governments, and requiring state compliance with federal regulatory statutes would
impermissibly impose on states a requirement to implement federal legislation.”126 The court
decreed that the Tenth Amendment limits the scope of Congress’s power under Article I, and as
a result, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”127
Later, in Printz v. United States,128 the Court struck down a federal statute requiring that
state and local law enforcement officers conduct background checks on prospective handgun
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purchasers.129 The court held that “Congress cannot . . . conscript[] the States' officers directly. . .
[s]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.”130 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that an original understanding
of the constitution and the framers’ intent leads only to the conclusion that the federal
government can only recommend certain regulations to the states, and cannot, by law, compel
them to act in any particular way.131 Justice Scalia drives his point home by referencing a
historical statute that sought to hold federal prisoners in state jail, providing a striking analogy to
the modern immigration detainers:
Not only do the enactments of the early Congresses, as far as we are aware, contain
no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government may command the
States' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutio na l
authorization, they contain some indication of precisely the opposite assumptio n.
On September 23, 1789-the day before its proposal of the Bill of Rights, the First
Congress enacted a law aimed at obtaining state assistance of the most rudimentar y
and necessary sort for the enforcement of the new Government's laws: the holding
of federal prisoners in state jails at federal expense. Significantly, the law issued
not a command to the States' executive, but a recommendation to their legislatures.
Congress “recommended to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws,
making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their goals, to receive and safe keep
therein all prisoners committed under the authority of the United States,” and
offered to pay 50 cents per month for each prisoner. Moreover, when Georgia
refused to comply with the request, Congress's only reaction was a law authorizing
the marshal in any State that failed to comply with the Recommendation of
September 23, 1789, to rent a temporary jail until provision for a permanent one
could be made.132
Justice Scalia also pointed out that the statute violated the separation of powers because
the constitution vests all executive power in the president, and Congress, as a result, cannot grant
executive authority to state and local governments.133
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In light of the realities of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, “Congress appears to have
taken care to avoid Tenth Amendment issues . . . .” in crafting the immigration statute. 134
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local law enforceme nt
official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances . . . the officer
or employee of the Service shall promptly determine whether or not to issue such
a detainer.135
If Congress had written INA § 287(d) in a manner that required, rather than permitted,
local law enforcement officials to report those arrested for violating controlled substance laws
and who are suspected of being immigration violators, and if it required them to request
immigration officials to “determine promptly whether or not to issue a detainer,” the facts would
be very similar in nature to the one at issue in Printz.”136
However, the language of the detainer regulation is more problematic in terms of
compatibility with the Tenth Amendment.137 The regulation reads as follows:
(d) Temporary detention at Department Request. Upon a determination by the
Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a crimina l
justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to
exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit
assumption of custody by the Department.138
Thus, if the regulation is interpreted in a manner that requires local LEAs to comply with
detainer requests, it will surely be regarded as unconstitutional. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals dealt with this issue in Galarza v. Szalczyk, noting that “[I]t is clear to us that reading §
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287.7 that a federal detainer filed with a state or local LEA is a command to detain an individual
on behalf of the federal government, would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth
Amendment.”139 The court asserts that “[b]ecause of this constitutional problem, and because
Congress has made no mention in the INA that it intends for DHS to issue mandatory detainers .
. . we must read the regulation as authorizing only permissive requests that local LEAs keep
suspected aliens subject to deportation in custody.”140
4. State and Local Government Liability in Detainer-Related Suits
Consistent with the aforementioned legal issues, state and local governments can be
liable in detainer-related suits, especially because compliance with ICE detainers is not
mandatory. The following cases illustrate the potential liability faced by local governments for
detaining individuals pursuant to ICE detainers.
i. Galarza v. Szalcyk:
The facts of Galarza are discussed above. 141 In Galarza, the Third Circuit ruled in
Galarza’s favor, holding that states and municipalities are not required to hold people based on
ICE detainers.142 The court recognized that ICE detainers are requests, not commands, and as a
result, Lehigh County was free to disregard the ICE detainer.143 For that reason, it shared
responsibility for violating Galarza’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights. 144 The case has
since settled.145 Together, the United States and the City of Allentown paid Galarza $50,000, and
Lehigh County paid $95,000 in damages and attorney’s fees.146
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ii. Morales v. Chadbourne:
Ada Morales was born in Guatemala and became a United States citizen in 1995. 147 In
May 2009, she was arrested by Rhode Island police on state charges related to alleged
misrepresentations on a state public benefits application.148 At some point, a state official
reported Ms. Morales’ name to the local ICE office. Shortly thereafter, ICE lodged a detainer
against her.149 During that time, a judge ordered Ms. Morales released, but Rhode Island officials
continued to hold her in custody for an additional 24 hours because of the ICE detainer. 150 Ms.
Morales protested to the officials that she was indeed a U.S. citizen, and even offered to show
them her passport, but her complaints fell on deaf ears. 151 She was finally released “after ICE
agents took her into federal custody, transported her to their office, and interviewed her.”152 This
was not the first time Ms. Morales had been wrongfully detained, in fact, she was detained five
years earlier under similar circumstances. 153
In April 2012, Ms. Morales filed a lawsuit against federal and state defendants, alleging
violations of her Fourth Amendment and due process rights and her rights under state law. 154 The
district court ruled that Morales alleged sufficient facts to support government violations of her
rights based on the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and Procedural Due
Process.155
ii. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnt’y:
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On March 14, 2012, Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a domestic violence
restraining order and was sent to jail.156 The jail did not know Miranda-Olivares’s immigration
status, but it had a policy of notifying ICE when a foreign-born person is brought to the Jail on a
warrant or probable cause charge.157 The following morning, the jail received an immigration
detainer, issued by ICE, for Miranda-Olivares.158 The detainer simply stated that DHS had
“initiated an investigation” to determine whether Miranda-Olivares was subject to removal from
the United States.159
The same day, a judge set Miranda-Olivares’s bail at $5,000, and in order to post bail,
Miranda-Olivares was required to post $500.160 Family members were prepared to post the $500
bail, but jail officials, on multiple occasions, warned that posting bail would not result in release
because the jail would keep Miranda-Olivares in custody as a result of the detainer. 161 After two
weeks, Miranda-Olivares’s criminal case was resolved, and was given a sentence of timeserved.162 But, rather than release Miranda-Olivares, the jail kept her in custody an additional
day, until ICE assumed custody.163
Miranda-Olivares sued Clackamas County for violating her civil rights.164 The court
rejected the County’s claim that it was legally required to comply with the detainer.165
Ultimately, the court ruled in favor Miranda-Olivares; holding that the County violated her
Fourth Amendment rights by detaining in spite a court order authorizing her release.166
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B. State Regulation: The TRUST ACT
When passing laws related to immigration law, states must be especially careful to avoid
issues of preemption, because immigration law is traditionally regulated by the Federal
Government.
1. Is the TRUST ACT Preempted by Federal Regulation?
i. Preemption Jurisprudence
In Arizona v. United States, the court illustrates how modern preemption doctrine plays
out in the context of state laws regulating immigration. 167 The court explains that the preemption
dilemma with respect to immigration regulatio n arises from the principle of federalism, which
entails that “both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is
bound to respect.168 The court observes that, “[f]rom the existence of two sovereigns follows the
possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes.”169 Yet, under our constitutional
design, [t]he Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.”170 Pursuant to this principle, “Congress has the power to preempt state law.”171
The court outlines three situations where federal law preempts state law. The first is
where Congress passes a bill containing a provision that “expressly preempts” state regulation. 172
The second, is where “the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress .
. . has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.”
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Generally, “[t]he intent to

displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation so pervasive that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it [or] where there is a federal interest so
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dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state law on the
same subject.”174 Third, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law.175 Conflict
preemption includes those cases where it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law
and those situations where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purpose and objectives of congress.”176
In Arizona, the court examined an Arizona law, Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070, against the
above-mentioned preemption framework. The court examined four sections of the bill. Section 3
– which makes it a crime for someone to be in the United States without proper authorization –
was preempted because Congress left no room for states to regulate in that field or enhance
federal prohibitions.177 Section 5(C) – which makes it a crime for undocumented immigrants to
apply for a job or work in Arizona – was also preempted because it stood as an obstacle to the
federal regulatory regime.178 Section 6 – which authorizes state law enforcement officials to
arrest any individual otherwise lawfully in the country – was preempted because whether and
when to arrest someone for being unlawfully in the country was a question solely for the federal
government.179
ii. TRUST Act is Not Preempted
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Following from this framework, it does not appear that federal law preempts the TRUST
Act. An important distinction must be made between Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the TRUST Act.
The former is a form of affirmative legislation that seeks to create a regime of immigration law
separate and distinct from existing federal regulations, while the latter is merely a form of
qualified-compliance with federal requests. This follows from the fact that compliance with ICE
detainers is not mandatory, and that ICE detainers serve merely as requests. Recently, the DHS
acknowledged that “detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 are voluntary requests.”180
Thus, the TRUST Act might have raised preemption issues if Congress intended to mandate state
compliance with ICE detainers. It is not clear, however, Congress intended to mandate state
compliance with ICE detainers, given the Tenth Amendment implications of doing so.
Additionally, the Executive Action initiated by the Obama Administration, overhauling portions
of the secure communities program, puts the TRUST Act more in line with the policies of federal
law, greatly reducing the risk of preemption.
C. Public Policy Concerns Raised by Detainer Requests
In addition to the legal issues raised by ICE detainers, several public policy concerns
arise as well. Among the public policy concerns raised by detainer enforcement is the cost to
state and local governments of enforcing ICE detainers and evidence that ICE detainers – and the
Secure Communities Program – have had no effect on crime, and may actually be an obstacle to
effective law enforcement.
1. The Cost of Enforcing Detainer Requests:
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The cost to state and local governments of enforcing detainers requests is amplified by
the fact that the federal government does not contribute to the costs incurred by state and local
governments in enforcing ICE detainers. According to 8 C.F.R. 287(e), the federal government is
not responsible for any such costs:
(e) Financial responsibility for detention. No detainer issued as a result of a
determination made under this chapter I shall incur any fiscal obligation on the part
of the Department, until actual assumption of custody by the Department, except as
provided in paragraph (d) of this section. 181
This is problematic because the cost of jailing people is significant and burdensome for
state and local governments. The cost of keeping an inmate in prison per day is about $460 in
New York, $145 in Chicago, and $128.94 in Los Angeles. In the aggregate, these costs are
significant. Between 2008 and 2012, ICE placed approximately 29,323 detainers on legal
permanent residents and U.S. citizens. 182
Additionally, state and local governments risk significant litigation costs if they continue
enforcing ICE detainers because they are liable in cases where an arrestees rights have been
violated due to detention pursuant to an ICE detainer. 183 Recently a number of jurisdictions have
incurred significant costs to do detainer-related suits184 : In Galarza v. Szalcyk, the City of
Allentown paid Galarza $50,000, and Lehigh County paid $95,000 in damages and attorney’s
fees;185 Jefferson County Colorado paid $40,000 for unjustifiably holding Luis Quezada on an
ICE detainer;186 Spokane County, Washington agreed to pay $40,000 to a man who was wrongly
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held without bail for 20 days because of an ICE detainer;187 and New York City paid $145,000 to
settle a lawsuit where a man was wrongly held by an ICE detainer requests. 188
In light of these fiscal realities, refusing to honor ICE requests or passing a law similar to
the Trust Act would significantly reduce the chances of wrongfully detaining someone pursuant
to a detainer request. Consequently, this would allow states and municipalities to significantly
reduce litigation and settlement costs that would otherwise arise. Hence, from a public policy
perspective, there is a financial incentive for state and local governments to reform their
compliance with federal ICE detainers.
2. Effect on Crime
According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University
(TRAC), “data from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) show that no more than 14
percent of the ‘detainers’ issued by the government in FY 2012 and the first four months of FY
2013 met the agency's stated goal of targeting individuals who pose a serious threat to public
safety or national security.”189 Indeed, statistics show that “roughly half of the 347,691
individuals subject to an ICE detainer (47.7 percent) had no record of a criminal conviction, not
even a minor traffic violation.”190 Interestingly, “[t]his thoroughly-documented government
enforcement effort sharply contrasts with the multiple press releases and official statements
issued by the agency.”191 Moreover, according to Miles & Cox, the Secure Communities
Program in general has “had no effect on the FBI index crime rate . . . [n]or did the program
reduce rates of violent crimes—of murder, rape, arson, or aggravated assault.”192
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Moreover, detainer enforcement significantly hinders community policing. Immigrant
residents who are victims or witnesses to crime, including domestic violence, are less likely to
report crime or cooperate with law enforcement when any contact with law enforcement could
result in deportation.193 A recent study found that Latinos, documented and undocumented, often
fear even minimal contact with the police, including for interactions as benign as reporting crime
or cooperating with a criminal investigation, as a result of fears due to potential immigration
consequences for themselves or their loved ones. 194 Therefore, by eliminating or constraining
compliance with ICE detainers, state and local governments can better improve relations
between law enforcement and certain minority communities – which makes for more effective
policing.
Given the fact that ICE detainers have little to no effect on reducing crime rates and the
fact that detainer enforcement strains relations between minority communities and the
authorities, public policy weighs heavily in favor of either eliminating compliance with ICE
detainers or restricting compliance to those cases involving serious crime (this would ensure that
the detainers issued are actually having a positive impact on the rate of crime).
IV.

Conclusion:
ICE detainers raise several issues. Among them are: legal and constitutional challenges;

liability incurred by municipalities; high enforcement costs; and an inability to lower crime rates.
Notably, there are no legal obstacles in the way of legislation seeking to significantly curtail the
scope of detainer requests. Therefore, states should follow the path of Connecticut and
California and pass legislation that significantly limits the scope of compliance with ICE
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detainers. In addition, local municipalities should consider refusing to honor detainers altogether.
While President Obama’s Executive Action overhauling the SCP altogether is a step in the right
direction, his actions are by no means permanent. The Executive Action is facing challenges in
Congress and the Courts; and could potentially be reversed following the 2016 presidential
elections. Given the extent of the problems raised by ICE detainers, state and local governments
ought to take the lead in governing the relationship between inmates in state and local jails and
federal immigration officials; either by passing their own version of the Trust Act, or by refusing
to honor ICE detainers generally.
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